European Union Military Operations by Niklas I. M. Nováky

Author:Niklas I. M. Nováky [Nováky, Niklas I. M.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, General, Europe, Political Science, International Relations, Security (National & International)
ISBN: 9781351590846
Google: s-1GDwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2018-01-12T05:03:04+00:00

Following the force generation conference on 10 June, the way was clear for the EU to launch Operation Artemis. On 12 June, the EU Council adopted a Council Decision launching the operation. This meant that the Council approved the Operation Plan as well as the Rules of Engagement and authorised Operation Commander Major General Neveux to release the activation order (ACTORD) ‘in order to execute the deployment of the forces, prior to transfer of authority following their arrival in theatre, and start execution of the mission’ (EU 2003b). Thus, Artemis was now officially launched. In a final demonstration of the sense of urgency that had driven the operation’s planning process ever since High Representative Solana had proposed turning the UN requested emergency force into an EU operation, the operation was not launched by the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). Instead, the symbolic honour of launching Artemis, which was both the first EU military operation outside Europe as well as the first autonomous EU military operation, was given rather ingloriously to the Agricultural and Fisheries (AGFISH) Council, the EU agriculture and fisheries ministers’ forum.

Following the decision of Chancellor Schröder’s cabinet that Germany would offer logistical and medical capabilities to Operation Artemis, the government quickly drafted a mandate and submitted it to the Bundestag on 13 June to get its approval. It stated that Germany’s contribution to Artemis would consist of security, medical, support and air transport forces (Deutscher Bundestag 2003b: 3). In addition, Germany would send several staff officers to the Operation Headquarters in Paris and, if necessary, provide forces that would serve as ‘connection points’ to the local governmental and non-governmental organisations as well as international organisations. The total number of personnel that Germany would make available for the operation was said to be 350 soldiers, which was surprisingly high. However, this number was intentionally inflated to make sufficient reserves available in case their use would be required at some point during the operation’s deployment (FAZ 2003f). After the mandate was submitted, Defence Minister Struck noted that this contribution was well within the ‘politically defined, justifiable limits’ that the government had set for Germany’s participation in the operation (BMVg 2003c).

At the debate that preceded the Bundestag’s vote on the mandate, both Defence Minister Struck and Foreign Minister Fischer had a chance to argue the case for supporting Germany’s participation in Operation Artemis. According to Struck, Artemis was an important contribution to the stabilisation of the DRC and showed that Europeans remained true to their ‘special responsibility’ towards Africa (BMVg 2003d). He added that it also supported Germany’s goal of developing the EU’s capabilities in the area of foreign and security policy so Europe would eventually become equipped to fulfil its share of responsibility of ensuring European and global security. On his own part, Fischer dismissed comments that the situation in the DRC was not in Germany’s interest by explaining that Europe’s security interests would become directly threatened if Africa started to export instability to other regions in the world (Auswärtiges Amt 2003d).

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